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Abstract
We test the degree to which presidential approval ratings are related to a series of economic indicators, controlling for the political
scenario in Brazil. Results, from 1999M9 until 2010M5, show that unemployment and the minimum wage are the main variables
that affect the ratings. There is also evidence that President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva has a higher approval rate than President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, keeping constant a reasonable number of important domestic and foreign indicators. However, when
controlled for a time trend, differences in popularity between both presidents vanish as the sample size grows. Our results support
the conclusion that the good state of the economy (given no political turmoil) is the main factor that explains and predicts Lula’s
high popularity.
© 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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Resumo
O artigo testa em que medida as taxas de aprovac¸ão do presidente do Brasil estão relacionadas com uma série de indicadores
econômicos, controlando para o cenário político. Os resultados, de 1999M9 até 2010M5, mostram que o desemprego e o salário
mínimo são as principais varive´is econômicas que afetam a aprovac¸ão. Também existe evidência que o Presidente Luis Inácio
Lula da Silva tem uma maior taxa de aprovac¸ão que o Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso, mantendo constante um número
razoável de importantes indicadores domésticos e estrangeiros. No entanto, quando se controla para uma tendência determinista,
as diferenc¸as de popularidade entre os dois presidentes desaparecem com o aumento da amostra. Os resultados permitem concluir
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ue o bom estado da economia (supondo a ausência de choques políticos) é um dos principais fatores que explica e prediz a alta
opularidade do Presidente Lula.
 2013 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
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.  Introduction
Two of the most important opinion research institutes in Brazil, Sensus and Datafolha, collect measures of the Presi-
ent’s public evaluation, providing their poll respondents with three alternative answers to his/her performance: positive,
egular and negative. The former president of Brazil, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) reached a staggering positive
ate of 72.5% in February 2009. By adding the proportion of respondents that evaluated the president as being regular,
hich is the rating that we define as “approval”, the figure rises to an outstanding 94.2%, making him one of the most
opular presidents in the history of Brazil. In the first hundred days in office, the “honeymoon” period, Lula’s average
ositive rating was at nearly 50%. Even after the end of this period, ratings never fell below 29% positive evaluation.1
Data on approval ratings in Brazil is incipient, starting in 1999M9 when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC)
as still in office. This president, who managed to tackle and bring under control a long-standing inflationary process,
eached a maximum positive rating of almost 30%. After years promoting modernizing economic reforms, he finished
is mandate with a positive evaluation of 26%, nearly half of Lula’s average. A characteristic of FHC’s period in office
 1995–2002 – was the frequency and strength of negative international shocks. In January 1999, Brazil devalued its
omestic currency as a response to capital outflows and a deteriorating Balance of Payments. In contrast, Lula’s admin-
stration was little troubled by international shocks, at least until the middle of 2008, which could explain his advantage.
In April 2009, at the G-20 summit in London, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, said of President
ula: “That’s my man right here. Love this guy. He’s the most popular politician on earth. It’s because of his good
ooks.” Data on Lula’s evaluation and Obama’s comments raise an interesting question: were there idiosyncratic
haracteristics that define Lula’s high popularity or was it the economy, which benefited both from the inheritance of
HC’s price stability and from high foreign demand and liquidity? In fact, one can pose a more general question: how
s the presidential approval rating influenced by domestic and foreign economic indicators in Brazil?
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between presidential approval ratings and economic
erformance in a consolidating democracy, having been controlled for political factors, international shocks and the
mpact of a president’s personality. By using time-series data from 1999M9 until 2010M5, we are able to unveil how
razilian citizens evaluate the performance of their president, giving special emphasis to economic indicators like
xchange rate and inflation, on the one hand, and political issues, on the other. Rather than analyze either poll results or
pproval ratings by means of descriptive statistics examination, our approach aims to provide a deeper understanding
f voter opinion by applying a rigorous econometric modeling strategy.
As well as analyzing the fascinating case of Lula’s high popularity vis  a  vis  the economic and political scenario, the
mportance of the present paper rests on three further factors. First of all, Brazil is the largest and wealthiest country
n Latin America. With a population of more than 190 million, it represents 34% of Latin America’s total population,
nd its 2006 GDP of approximately US$ 1.1 billion, corresponds to nearly 38% of the region’s figure.
Secondly, the country can be regarded as a relatively young democracy, having returned to this political regime
n 1984, after 20 years of military dictatorship. As the democratic regime is relatively new, voters may have limited
xperience in the process of choosing their representatives. For this reason, it is especially interesting to investigate
ow Brazilian citizens evaluate their political leaders according to the economic and political environment.
Thirdly, to our knowledge, the study is original in the econometric use of the Brazilian time-series data. As will be
hown, the related literature is particularly focused on the results of election polls. Studies in this area had been carried
1 The trough, in June 2004, happened at the heat of a corruption scandal involving members of the government that were very close to the president.
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out for several countries but not for Brazil. Our work thus complements the Political Science and the New Political
Economy literature by providing evidence on the relationship between approval ratings and a series of economic and
political indicators in Brazil. The sample period, ultimately determined by data availability, covers a significant part of
both offices of former President FHC and the administration of President Lula. Nevertheless, as will be shown, changes
in the economic and political variables in the period being investigated were substantial. Regarding the econometric
methodology, our study is also innovative. Since there are thousands of models to be investigated (for our choice of
independent variables, deterministic components and lags), we apply an automated model selection approach based
on the theory of reduction, which is later explained.
This paper has three further sections, besides this introduction. Section 2 discusses the economical and political
background while Section 3 presents the related literature concerning government evaluation and economic perfor-
mance. Section 4 describes the methodological approach and the dataset explored in the empirical tests. The estimation
results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented.
2.  Economic  and  political  background
After 20 years of military dictatorship, Fernando Collor de Mello was the first president elected by direct voting, in
1989. Amidst great political turmoil, Collor de Mello was impeached in 1992 after being accused of corruption. His
vice-president, Itamar Franco, assumed the office and managed to finish the mandate. Franco’s Finance Minister, FHC,
who was elected president in 1994, was the first democratically elected one since Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961)
to complete his political mandate, meaning that democratic stability was a novelty in that political scenario.
The economy under FHC was subjected to many international shocks in the 1990s (the contagion from economic
crises in Mexico – 1995, Asia – 1997 and Russia – 1998). Domestic shocks also hit the economy hard at the end of that
decade and into the beginning of the next. Managing to successfully control the Brazilian inflationary process, from
close to 3000% in 1993 to 15% in 1995, is likely to be the most important factor that helped FHC to win reelection in
1998. The pegged exchange rate regime adopted as a monetary anchor survived these various episodes of international
crises, but the Central Bank was not able to sustain the peg, leading to Brazil’s own financial crisis in January 1999.
Further shocks occurred in 2001 with the energy crisis, which seriously limited aggregate production, and with the
terrorist attacks against the United States at the end of that year. A final shock the consequences of which were only fully
felt under the next government, came with the sharp depreciation of the domestic currency in 2002. This significant
hike in the exchange rate was observed after the polls indicated an increased likelihood of the left-wing candidate’s
victory (Lula).
President Lula took office in 2003. After a bad first year, the Brazilian economy presented higher economic growth
rates relative to those observed during FHC’s government. A significant part of this growth can be credited to the
high level of international liquidity, an elevated growth in foreign demand (particularly economic growth in countries
that were, or became, important trade partners), the increased international price of commodities and the absence of
significant international shocks (at least before the financial crisis at the end of 2008). Furthermore, there was also
an increase in domestic consumption, both in the private and public sectors, which led to decreasing unemployment
throughout this period. The changing economic scenario points to the need to condition the approval ratings to economic
developments.
In addition to the changing economic scenario, the sample period also covers two leaderships that can be seen as
representing different ideological views and interest groups. FHC, a former university professor, has been associated
with the richest groups of Brazilian society. Despite belonging to a center political party (PSDB), he was seen as
a right-wing politician whose main economic purpose was to control the huge inflationary process, while leaving
discontentment regarding unemployment and social welfare to his successor. President Lula, in turn, was a former
syndicate leader and founder of the Worker’s Party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores). Lula was elected mainly due to
the high number of votes provided by those living in the poorest regions of the country.
Although there were differences, both offices shared one common aspect: they were hit by several political scandals
that consequentially damaged the image of the president. For instance, in 2001, during FHC’s second mandate, Antônio
Carlos Magalhães, a former Brazilian senator who was politically aligned to the Federal government, decided to leave
office after being accused of violating the Senate’s electronic display. Accusations of buying congressional votes to try
to pass an amendment to the constitution that allowed for reelection also negatively impacted on the president’s image.
In 2005, during Lula’s first term, Brazilian citizens became aware of a corruption scheme called “Mensalão” (“Big
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onthly Allowance”). In this scheme, Brazilian federal deputies received cash payments in exchange for approving
ertain central government projects. Some of these agreements were arranged during the pre-election campaign. In
pite of the clear involvement of several leading politicians that were closely linked to the president, Lula managed
o secure reelection in 2006. In the midst of this scandal, he had a 41% positive evaluation and the sum of positive
nd regular evaluation, the “approval” rate, reached 82.9%. The question is: was this due to Lula’s personal charisma
r was the approval related to the economic situation, since annual inflation was 3.4% and real GDP growth reached
.7% in 2006?
.  Literature  review
The literature that focuses on the evaluation of political leaders based on economic performance is diverse. Some
f the papers consider that economic voting is based on the idea that the electorate relies, at least in part, on past
conomic performance when evaluating the incumbent relative to alternative candidates. Aggregate data usually sup-
orts the perception that in presidential and congressional elections, the incumbent gets credit for good economic
imes and is blamed for bad ones. Kramer (1971) was one of the first to show such evidence for the USA – Kinder
nd Kiewiet (1981), Peltzman (1990) and Leigh and Wolfers (2006) are additional references that give support to the
ame idea. Regarding other single-country studies analyzed by the most recent literature, Jordahl (2006) also found
vidence that good macroeconomic conditions increase the number of votes received by the incumbent government
n Sweden. Concerning a Latin-American country, Cerda and Vergara (2007) use a panel of Chilean municipalities
nd conclude that a rise in the national rate of unemployment decreases the incumbent’s share of votes in presidential
lections. Finally, shedding light on multi-country studies, Brender and Drazen (2005) evaluate how the probability
f reelection of chief executives is affected by fiscal behavior in a panel of countries between 1960 and 2003. The
esults indicate that voters do not reward politicians who engage in an election-year budget manipulation. In developed
ountries and consolidated democracies, the result is the opposite and suggests that voters are more likely to return
hief executives to power if they have promoted reductions in the debt to GDP ratio. This suggests that voters in devel-
ped and in developing countries are influenced differently by the economic policies carried out by their respective
overnments.
The previous papers tend to evaluate the performance of politicians in polls, which is measured by the proportion
f votes received or by evaluating whether the politician has been reappointed or not to the office. A different strand
f the related literature analyzes not only the voting period, but the entire political mandate using usually monthly or
uarterly frequency data concerning public opinion of the executive chiefs. By doing so, it is possible to evaluate not
nly the periods closer to elections, but also to provide a deeper evaluation of government approval.
In this context, Chappell (1990) is a relevant work, as it clearly states that presidential voting and presidential approval
hould not be taken as the same thing. By jointly estimating equations that explain presidential voting and presidential
pproval ratings – using quarterly data from 1953 to 1988 for the United States of America (US henceforth) – results
how that GNP growth and inflation appear to matter for both voters and poll respondents. Interestingly, estimates
ndicate that poll respondents are more concerned with inflation and less concerned with GNP growth than voters.
hese results may be seen as highly relevant in this context, as it shows that one must be cautious regarding the
nalysis of voting data and poll data. When considering why voting and approval ratings might differ in the way they
espond to economic indicators, a distinction between retrospective and prospective considerations are likely to be more
mportant. While approval ratings might be more related to the past actions of a leader, voting would also be associated
ith the electoral campaign when promises for the future are made. This is one of the important reasons to analyze
ata concerning government approval ratings, since we can base our analysis on past economic and political data.
In line with the previous discussion, there are some papers worth mentioning for our purposes: Arce (2003)
nalyzes the popular approval of Peruvian presidents from 1985 to 1997, based on two specific criteria: economic
erformance and government policies carried out to control political violence in that country. Concerning the first of
hese two criteria, the study reveals there were not major differences between Presidents Alan Garcia and Alberto
ujimori. Rising inflation had a consistently negative impact on presidential support, independent of the type of
conomic management program adopted (that were, in practice, different). Regarding political violence, the empir-
cal evidence shows that this factor appears as a significant predictor of presidential approval for both Garcia and
ujimori. More importantly, rising guerrilla activities affected their popularity in a different manner. Garcia was
erceived by the population as being soft on political violence, while Fujimori was seen on the opposite extreme. In
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this view, higher levels of guerrilla activity ought to hurt a left-leaning government like Garcia’s because voters are
likely to attribute the violence to his “softness”. In contrast, higher levels of guerrilla activity may not necessarily
hurt a right-leaning government like Fujimori’s because voters are likely to see violence as rationalizing a hard-line
stance.
Another study concerning evaluation of presidential approval is McAvoy (2006), who focuses on American opinion
polls for the 1977–2002 period. Besides emphasizing economic indicators, like Arce (2003), special attention was
paid to another key issue, foreign policy approval. By using quarterly data concerning American’s opinions on the
performance of the President’s government, the empirical results show that both economic policy and foreign policy
matter in the public’s evaluation of the president. The findings also suggest that the public learns and changes the
way it uses foreign policy in their assessment of the president. On the other hand, the weight of the economy on
the public’s evaluation of the president remains steady through good and bad times. Finally, still regarding studies
that emphasize rates of presidential approval, Geys and Vermeir (2008) analyzes the rates of presidential approval in
the US: more precisely, they test the influence of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure by using a time
series approach (quarterly data covering the period from 1959 to 2006). Their results indicate that fiscal policy has
an important influence on presidential approval ratings, as ratings appear to be influenced by increases in both the tax
burden and the deficit.
Bernhard and Leblang (2006) carry out an interesting investigation of opinion polls and economic news for a
parliamentary system. The authors study the relationship between unexpected exchange rate changes and opinion
polls in the United Kingdom from the June 11, 1987 election until June 21st, after the 2001 election, using a weekly
time series. Their hypothesis is that variables are endogenous in the sense that currency market activity affect opinion
polls, as exchange rates can be related to welfare (and vice-versa), as traders anticipate a change in cabinet and thus
economic policy. They estimate a voting intention model for the government, including the first difference of the voting
intention on the left hand side and controls, such as lagged vote intention, changes in inflation and unemployment and
a great number of dummies for economic and political events – for example, dummies for a “honeymoon” period,
election dates, the stock market crash of 1987, the foot-and-mouth disease and so on.2 Results show that changes in
unemployment are significantly related to changes in voting intention whereas inflation and other control variables are
not significant (with the clear exception of the dummy variables). They use the residuals of this estimation to create a
variable that would supposedly reflect unexpected positive and negative news regarding political support. Finally they
test the correlation between political news and exchange rate surprises.3 Their finding is that unexpected depreciations
lead to a decrease in the voting intention for the government and that negative public opinion shocks cause a currency
depreciation. Also, exchange rate volatility increases when opinion polls do not clearly indicate the outcome of an
electoral outcome.
The number of studies concerned with the Brazilian Political Economy has been increasing over the recent years.
As a first example, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) find that, in a panel of Brazilian municipalities from 1988
to 2000, mayors who spend more during their terms in office increase the probability of their own reelection or
of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections
and higher current expenditures in election years are beneficial to their reelection. Motivated by a different reason,
but still regarding political aspects in the Brazilian society, Ferraz and Finan (2011) conclude that first-term mayors
are associated with significantly less corruption than those in their second and final term. The level of corruption is
especially lower in those cities with a higher level of political competition. According to the authors, these results
suggest that the possibility of re-election creates a “discipline effect”, inducing first-term mayors with re-election
incentives to extract fewer rents from power. However, in a related empirical assessment regarding Brazil, Pereira
et al. (2009) argue that when corruption is not likely to be detected and the pay-offs involved are very large, Brazilian
politicians do not align their interests with that of the voters and are likely to engage in corrupt practices. Their
results are quite opposite to those of Ferraz and Finan (2011) and suggest that enhancing the quality and quantity
of information available to citizens is not enough to foreclose the incentive to commit crimes. However, irrespective
of their conclusions and purposes, the latter studies and our own have the Brazilian Political Economy as a common
motivation.
2 See the detailed list of dummies in Bernhard and Leblang (2006, p. 37).
3 For details of how they estimated exchange rate surprises, see the aforementioned paper.
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.  Methodology
Our objective is to estimate the following model
at =  γ0 +  γ1 · t +
n∑
j=1
αjf
(j)
t +  t, (1)
here the subscript t refers to time, at is the approval rating of the president, f (j)t is the jth economic or political
ndicator, γ0 is the idiosyncratic characteristic of the president that is important for his/hers popularity (we assume
hat this is some constant level of approval given by people’s preferences), γ1 controls for a deterministic time trend,
t aggregates all random unobserved variables that affect the president’s approval and finally, αj are parameters. Given
hat the approval rating might exhibit some dynamics, we add memory to the process of the dependent variable and
e also add lags to the independent variables, as can be seen below:
at =  γ0 +  γ1 · t +  γ2 · DLula  +  γ3 ·  DLula  · t +
n∑
j=1
pj∑
i=0
αj,if
(j)
t−i +
T∑
k=1
βkat−k +  t, (2)
here αj,i, βk, γ2 and γ3 are paremeters; n, pj and T  are self-explanatory. The implicit test assumption is that the
inear combination of fundamentals can be a proxy for the macroeconomic conditions that affect opinion polls. The
haracteristics that make Lula differ from FHC will be summarized in an intercept dummy, DLula, which assumes 1
uring Lula government and 0 during FHC’s – if this variable is statistically significant, there is evidence that citizen’s
erception about their President is not only related to economic indicators, but also to his or her own idiosyncrasy. In
rder to control for changes in the political scenario stemming from corruption scandals, we will use an index variable
hat will be explained in the next section.
As mentioned earlier, we use the automated selection procedure embedded in the econometric package Oxmetrics –
utometrics. This algorithm performs a general-to-specific model selection based on the theory of reduction.4 Designed
o simplify dynamic and linear model regressions, they build on the search processes put forward by Hoover and Perez
1999). Autometrics is able to select the relevant variables from those that compose a General Unrestricted Model
GUM), according to specified diagnostic tests and significance levels. If the GUM contains the variables that are
mportant to the Data Generation Process (DGP), it is shown to retrieve a final model that is encompassing (Hendry
nd Krolzig, 2005).
Political Science, New Political Economy and Economic theory help us to specify the variables in the GUM, to
nsure that variables are orthogonalized, to perform appropriate data transformations, to calibrate the algorithm and,
nally, to interpret the results. The method is appropriate because, for the explanatory variables, lags and deterministic
pecification in our General Unrestricted Model, we would have to estimate separately 216 sub models and consider
6! possible paths. This computational burden justifies the need for the automated process. We are also able to use
 standardized testing procedure for different models and can benefit from the rigour of the “theory of reduction”.
utometrics considers a tree search that corresponds to the whole model space, which are tested until a dominant
ncompassing reduction is selected (Doornik, 2009). The objective is to reduce a model, possibly finding a specification
hat is absent of misspecification.
Tests were performed using expert settings for Autometrics. We departed from the customized settings and calibrated
he algorithm to impose no constraints on heteroscedasticity and ARCH effects, as those tests would be important for
nference but not parameter consistency.
.1.  DataOur dataset comprises monthly observations covering the period that spans from 1999M9 until 2010M5. As men-
ioned in the Introduction, the dependent variable, the presidential approval rate, was obtained from Sensus and
atafolha, two of the most important opinion research institutes in Brazil. In order to measure the evaluation of the
4 For a summary discussion of this theory see Hendry and Krolzig (2004) and Hendry and Krolzig (2003). For a description of the algorithm see
oornik (2009) and for recent applications see Castle and Hendry (2009) and Ferreira (2010).
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Positive: no interpolation 
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Positive: with interpolation 
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80
90
Approval’s rate Fig. 1. President’s positive ratings and approval ratings.
Source: own elaboration using data from Sensus and Datafolha.
President as the Executive chief, both institutions provide the respondents three alternatives: positive, regular and
negative. We constructed the series of approval rating by summing the proportion of positive and regular evaluations.
In what follows, we used approval ratings for the tests.
Fig. 1 shows the linear interpolation that was carried out with the data, due to missing observations, and also presents
the approval ratings series.
It is worth emphasizing that two main questions are addressed in this study. At a more general level, our work aims at
investigating how the President’s rate of approval is influenced by macroeconomic conditions – in order to achieve this
goal we include a set of macroeconomic variables, such as domestic and foreign unemployment and risk, for instance,
in our estimations of approval ratings. The second question relates to the existence of significant differences between
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Table 1
Control (proxy) variables and expected signs.
Control for Variable Description Expected sign Ceteris paribus
explanation
Liquidity and solvency problems Public deficit to GDP ratio The first difference of the
total public debt to GDP
ratio.
Negative Indicative measure of the
health of the public
accounts.
Real sector Unemployment Unemployment in several
metropolitan regions of
Brazil.
Negative Less employment
decreases total welfare.
Purchasing power Domestic inflation Consumer price inflation. Negative Seignoriage, especially
coming from inflation tax
can raise political
instability. It might also
signalize structural
problems in government
finances.
Minimum wage Value of the minimum
wage.
Positive An increase in the
minimum wage, which
can be directly mapped
into president’s actions,
may increase popularity,
keeping inflation constant.
International shocks US inflation Annual change of the CPI
in percentage.
Unknown Worsening in overall risk
but it can raise awareness
of relatively better
situation in the domestic
economy.
US unemployment Percentage of the
unemployed in the
workforce.
Worsening in the foreign
demand. However, it can
raise awareness of
relatively better situation
in the domestic economy.
Economic scenario Selic Brazil The monthly annualised
nominal base interest rate
(determined by the
Central Bank).
Negative Since the president of the
Central Bank is appointed
by the federal government
during his own term, the
change in the interest rate
can affect his popularity.
Political instance good and bad News regarding the
president were taken from
Veja’s front cover in order
to construct indexes
variables that capture the
political scenario.
Negative Instability, mainly due to
corruption scandals
involving either the
president or members of
the government (or close
allies), damage the
S
F
t
c
b
i
p
t
opresident’s image.
ource: own elaboration.
HC and Lula’s approval rates, after having controlled for the macroeconomic conditions. If such differences do exist,
hen personal characteristics exert an important influence on the way Brazilian citizens evaluate their federal executive
hief.
All macroeconomic control variables were obtained from different sources at Ipeadata, an official institute maintained
y the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Brazilian Presidency. An explanation of these covariates is presented in Table 1,
ncluding their respective expected signs. It can be seen in Table 1, for example, that domestic unemployment is a
roxy for real sector performance, the public deficit to GDP ratio is a proxy for liquidity and solvency problems while
he North-American rate of unemployment is a proxy for external shocks.
A list with the description of the variables with their IPEA codes can be seen in Table 2. A plot of a selected number
f variables that were used in the GUM is presented in Figs. 2 and 3.
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Fig. 2. Selected domestic economic indicators.
Sources: Domestic Inflation and Domestic Unemployment from IBGE, Minimum Wage from Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, Selic from the Brazilian Central Bank.
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Table 2
Data obtained from IPEADATA (different sources).
Variable Description and notes Sources and codes
Domestic unemployment We used the 1st code from 2001M10
onwards and used the rate of change
of the second code in order to fill the
gap from 1999M9 to 2001M9.
1st Taxa de desemprego – referência: 30 dias – RMs –
IBGE/PME – PMEN12 TD12 Taxa de desemprego
aberto 2nd RMs (referência 30 dias) IBGE PME antiga:
PME12 TDA12
Domestic inflation No transformation on the raw data. IPCA – geral – índice (dez. 1993 = 100) IBGE/SNIPC –
PRECOS12 IPCA12
Public deficit First difference of the total public
sector debt
Dívida – total – setor público – líquida – (% PIB) –
BCB Boletim F. Públ. – BM12 DTSPY12
Minimum Wage No transformation on the raw data. Salário mínimo – R$ – MTE – MTE12 SALMIN12.
Selic No transformation on the raw data Taxa de juros – Over/Selic – (% a.m.) – Banco Central
do Brasil, Boletim, Sec¸ão mercado financeiro e de
capitais (BCB Boletim/M. Finan.) – BM12 TJOVER12
Foreign inflation Percentage change Estados Unidos – IPC – índice (média 1982–84 = 100) –
BLS – BLS12 IPCEUAS12
Foreign unemployment No transformation on the raw data. Estados Unidos – taxa de desemprego - forc¸a de
S
s
w
e
a
t
i
o
a
E
t
G
c
i
−
−
−
S
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In order to capture the effects of the internal political atmosphere, we included an original index for the political
cenario, which was constructed using the front cover of Veja, the main weekly Brazilian magazine. More precisely,
e constructed this index by analyzing the front cover of this publication, which were classified as “Bad” and “Good”,
ach variable showing the proportion of front covers in a month that mention the president or the central government in
 negative and positive way, respectively. In the first Table of Annex A, one can see the magazine titles that motivated
his characterization. Finally, with the intention of evaluating the idiosyncratic Lula and FHC’s rate of approval, we
ncluded a dummy variable which, as previously explained, assumes 1 during Lula government and 0 during FHC’s.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. It is possible to conclude from the analysis of descriptive statistics
nly, that the economy was relatively stable (in comparison to the 1980s and 1990s). One can see, for instance, that
verage monthly inflation was 0.5% in Brazil in comparison to 0.2% in the US. The Brazil risk as measured by the
MBI+(roughly the average spread between a Real and Dollar denominated Brazilian assets) was approximately 6%,
he average current account deficit remained at nearly 1% of the GDP and the public deficit as a percentage of the
DP was, on average, balanced. On the other hand, the political scenario was not as good. The index for Veja’s front
over shows that negative news predominated during the period. A comparison between both presidents is presented
n Table 4. Lula’s government benefited from lower levels of country risk, domestic inflation, nominal interest rates,
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Foreign Inflation
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Bad
Fig. 3. Selected foreign economic indicator and political scenario.
ource: Foreign Inflation is the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers – U.S. city average (all items), not seasonally adjusted, from the
ureau of Labour Statistics. “Bad” corresponds to own elaboration.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. deviation Maximum Minimum
Approval 75.9 14.6 96.0 34.00
Nominal interest rate (Selic) 15.9 4.4 28.1 7.3
Minimum wage 290.5 110.7 510.0 136.00
Domestic inflation 0.5 0.4 3.0 −0.2
Domestic unemployment 10.4 1.9 14.8 6.8
Public deficit 0.0 1.1 6.7 −4.0
Foreign inflation 0.2 0.4 1.2 −1.9
Foreign unemployment 5.7 1.6 10.2 3.9
Bad 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.0
Good 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Source: own elaboration.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics: FHC × Lula.
FHC Lula
Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation
Approval 57.5 9.9 84.2 6.6
Nominal interest rate (Selic) 18.1 2.0 15.0 4.8
Minimum wage 168.1 23.5 345.5 87.7
Domestic inflation 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3
Domestic unemployment 12.0 1.2 9.7 1.7
Public deficit 0.3 1.6 −0.2 0.7
Foreign inflation 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5
Foreign unemployment 4.8 0.8 6.1 1.8
Bad 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Good 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: own elaboration.
domestic unemployment, current account deficit and public deficit. As can be seen, foreign (US) unemployment and
the minimum wage were higher. On the negative side, “bad news” (reflecting the political scenario) were particularly
higher during Lula.
We did not present the correlation coefficients between approval ratings and the variables that were chosen to control
for the economic and political scenario, as our objective is to obtain a ceteris  paribus  interpretation or to identify a
partial effect. In order to avoid possible endogeneity problems (due to simultaneity, for instance), we performed tests
using instrumental variables. We used two lags of the contemporaneous variables in the right-hand side of the estimated
equation as instruments, eliminating or alleviating any possible correlation with the contemporaneous error. As far
as there is no error autocorrelation in the regression residuals and that there is some degree of persistence with the
explanatory variables, which is the general case, the instruments are likely to perform well.
Before presenting the test results, we must stress that all variables included in the GUM were tested for unit roots
and there is evidence that the GUM includes variables that are either stationary or stationary around a deterministic
time trend. Stationarity tests can be found in Table 5. We also used a general to specific approach to determine the
lag-length of the unit root tests, starting with a general model with three lags and then reducing the model. Table 5
shows that one cannot reject the null of a unit root for the Selic rate and foreign unemployment at the 10% significance
level. We used the first difference of the variables that were found to be non-stationary during this sample period in
the GUM and also included a deterministic time trend in the model.
5.  ResultsWe first show the results obtained with the Instrumental Variables Estimation (IVE) using two stage least squares
and the GUM as presented in Table 6. Besides the economic and political explanatory variables, the constant, the
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Table 5
Unit root tests.
Lags Specification ADF-statistic
Approval 0 Constant and trend −3.66*
Nominal interest rate (Selic) 3 no deterministic −1.07
Minimum wage 0 Constant and trend −3.41***
Domestic inflation 0 Constant and trend −5.46*
Domestic unemployment 0 Constant and trend −3.81**
Public deficit 0 Constant and trend −12.91*
Foreign inflation 1 Constant and trend −7.29*
Foreign unemployment 2 No deterministic 1.47
Source: own elaboration.
* Stands for rejection of the null of a unit root at 1% confidence level.
** Stands for rejection of the null of a unit root at 5% confidence level.
***
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e also tested for unit roots using a constant and time trend for the Selic rate and the foreign unemployment series.
ime trend and Lula’s dummies, we also included two other dummies in order to control for the variation in approval
ates that were not properly captured by these explanatory variables, especially during Cardoso’s presidency. The first
ummy, “negative FHC”, receives the value 1 for June 2000, May and June 2001, −1 for July 2000 and 0 otherwise.
e believe that it reflects the volatility in the rate of approval due to the federal political crisis that was sparkled by
he violation of the senate’s electronic voting panel by senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães, a president’s political ally,
s mentioned before. The other dummy is interesting and points out to the existence of a calendar effect during FHC’s
econd term. Inspection of the data shows that approval rates increased from 38% in 1999M12 to 56% in 2000M1,
rom 57.5% in 2000M12 to 65.8% in 2001M1 and, finally, from 60.9% in 2001M12 to 65.6% in 2002M1 without any
ajor change in the economic or political scenario, as measured by our choice of variables. Its inclusion considerably
able 6
eneral Unrestricted Model (IVE) – approval is the dependent variable
Coefficient Std.Error t-Value t-Prob
pproval (1st lag) 0.71 0.08 8.72 0.00
onstant 31.96 9.72 3.29 0.00
omestic inflation −1.49 1.57 −0.95 0.34
inimum wage 0.09 0.04 1.96 0.05
hange in Selic −0.09 0.21 −0.43 0.66
omestic unemployment −2.11 0.77 −2.76 0.01
ublic deficit 0.35 0.53 0.66 0.51
oreign inflation −0.001 0.010 −0.069 0.945
oreign unemployment – 1st diff. −0.195 0.116 −1.680 0.096
ula’s dummy 17.77 6.06 2.93 0.00
rend −0.16 0.13 −1.27 0.21
ula’s trend −0.23 0.12 −1.95 0.05
ood 5.80 16.05 0.36 0.72
ad −10.98 4.43 −2.48 0.01
egative FHC −8.17 1.71 −4.77 0.00
anuary FHC 7.29 2.12 3.44 0.00
iagnostic tests
R1-7 F(7, 104) = 0.880[0.5247]
RCH1-7 F(7, 97) = 0.605[0.7499]
ormality χ2(2) = 1.900[0.3867]
eteroscedasticity F(28, 82) = 1.878[0.0150]
ource: own elaboration.
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Table 7
Final selection using Autometrics and IVE – approval is the dependent variable.
Coefficient Std.Error t-Value t-Prob
approval (1st lag) 0.68 0.08 8.66 0.00
Constant 31.78 8.76 3.63 0.00
Domestic inflation −2.07 1.46 −1.41 0.16
Minimum wage 0.06 0.03 1.86 0.06
Change in Selic −0.13 0.21 −0.63 0.54
Domestic unemployment −1.66 0.57 −2.89 0.00
Public deficit 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.99
Lula’s dummy 16.40 5.43 3.02 0.00
Lula’s trend −0.25 0.12 −2.13 0.03
Good 12.34 14.23 0.87 0.39
Bad −11.54 3.96 −2.92 0.00
Negative FHC −7.84 1.69 −4.64 0.00
January FHC 7.58 2.00 3.78 0.00
Diagnostic tests
AR1-7 F(7, 107) = 0.483[0.8449]
ARCH1-7 F(7, 100) = 0.285[0.9582]
Normality χ2(2) = 4.064[0.1310]
Heteroscedasticity F(22, 91) = 2.915[0.0002]
Source: own elaboration.
Note: It is important to re-emphasise that two lags of the explanatory variables were added as instruments in the GUM.reduced the normality problem of the GUM.5 Hence, we included a dummy variable, named “January FHC”, which
receives the value 1 in all January months during Cardoso’s presidency and zero otherwise.
Table 6 shows that approval rates rise when there is an increase in the minimum wage, public deficit, good news and
during January months in Cardoso’s office. On the other hand, approval rates fall when there is an increase in domestic
inflation, a positive change in the Selic rate, domestic unemployment, foreign unemployment, foreign inflation and
bad news. Lula’s intercept dummy is positive and both trends are modelled with a negative sign, however the negative
parameter is higher during Lula’s period.
As can be seen in Table 6, the GUM presents no specification problem, with the exception of heteroskedasticity,
which is not rejected at 5%. Although we have to be cautious about inference, as it can be affected by the violation
of the homoskedasticity assumption and also dampened by higher standard errors due to the use of two stage least
squares, results suggest that some variables are significant while others are not, which reinforces the case for model
reduction.
In sequence, we performed the automated model selection using expert settings in Autometrics.6 The final selection
is presented in Table 7. Diagnostic tests imply that the final model is absent of mis-specification at 5%, with the
exception of the heteroscedasticity problem.
One can see in Table 7 that several variables were selected as regressors in the final model. A first result suggests
that the rate of approval is relatively persistent over time - the coefficient regarding the first lag is 0.68, statistically
significant at 1%. This dynamics can be related to other macroeconomic or social conditions that are not captured by
the other fundamentals but were present in the previous periods. It could also be due to the slow dissemination of news
regarding president’s evaluation.
5 The χ2(2) statistics, which tests for normality, decreases from a value of 12.4 and rejection of normality at 1%, to 1.9 and no rejection of the
null hypothesis of normal residuals at a high confidence level.
6 As mentioned before, we relaxed the restriction on heteroscedasticity and ARCH effects, since there is no effect in the consistency of the
estimated parameters.
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The signs that were presented for the first GUM do not change in the final selection, however there is a small variation
n parameter values.7 Although we have to be cautious with respect to the interpretation of the point estimates, a simple
xercise can help to provide a rough measure of the ceteris  paribus  correlation of the explanatory variables to approval
ates. As can be inferred from Table 7, an increase of one percentage point in the rate of inflation, decreases approval
y 2.07 percentage points, although the coefficient appears to be insignificant. An increase in the minimum wage of
 R$ during this period, increases approval by 0.06 percentage points, keeping inflation constant, with a significant
oefficient at 10%. A decrease of one percentage point in the domestic unemployment rate, increase approval rates
y 1.66 percentage points (i.e., for instance, when unemployment falls from 11% to 10%, approval rates increase
.66%, for example, from 60% to 61.66%). The unemployment effect is not only relatively large, but also significant
t the 1% level.8 Nonetheless, we provide a thorough discussion regarding the relationship between approval rates and
nemployment in the next section.
Having discussed the coefficients regarding the macroeconomic controls, we now analyze the political variables.
he “Bad” index, which is a proxy for the political environment, takes a negative value, meaning that approval rates
re negatively correlated to our measure of political mood. Because of the stationary and autoregressive nature of the
odel, this effect dissipates asymptotically after the bad news disappears. A proportion of four consecutive Veja front
overs highlighting negative news with regards to the presidency, decreases approval rates by 11.5 percentage points.9
lthough the index seems to be explaining approval rates reasonably well during the whole period, as reflected by a
arge and very significant parameter for bad news, there was a need to include an additional dummy for the bad political
cenario during Cardoso’s presidency, “negative FHC”, as well as positive (the “January effect”).
Finally, our second political variable provides an interesting result: according to the value of Lula’s dummy, there
s strong evidence that, irrespective of the improved fundamentals and the smaller number of shocks during his period
n office, he has a head start in comparison to President Cardoso – as previously stated, this idiosyncratic characteristic
ould be due to his popular charisma. The coefficient is statistically significant at 1% and it shows that, ceteris  paribus,
he difference between Lula and FHC is about 16.4% percentage points.10
However, notice that the negative time trend found for FHC’s office is eliminated from the final model while it is
till present during Lula’s administration. This means that, although the intercept is higher under Lula, the difference
etween FHC’s and Lula’s approval rate decreases 0.25 percentage points each month, when controlled for a time trend
nd keeping everything else constant. The finding of a negative time trend is very important not only for estimation
urposes: given the same economic conditions, Lula’s head start in comparison to Cardoso disappears in 65.6 months
7 Several specifications that were tested for the GUM show that parameter signs are mostly as expected – see Table 1, for a brief discussion on
xpected signs. However, it must be stressed that the final selection can be sensitive to the specification of the GUM and the choice of technique
OLS with contemporaneous or lagged variables, for example, and IVE).
8 This effect was found to be smaller in a working paper version of the present work, Ferreira and Sakurai (2009). This was due to the fact that the
rst difference of the log of the unemployment rate was used as an explanatory variable and the log of the approval rate was used as the left hand side
ariable. We thus concluded that, “although decreasing rates of unemployment caused an increase in approval ratings, this channel was not as strong
s one could expect. A possible reason for the smaller impact might be related to our choice of treating unemployment rate as a unit root – we may
ave thrown away information contained in the level of this variable.” In the current version of the paper, we have employed the level of approval
ates in order to avoid confusion with the interpretation of the elasticities, since many variables are already expressed in percentage terms. We also
sed the level of unemployment as one of the right hand side variables, as results using the general to specific method for lag selection indicate that
e can reject the unit root when controlling for a time trend in the level of unemployment. The different variables that appear in this version of the
aper and not in the aforementioned working paper version, were due to the incorporation of interesting feedbacks. In particular, we dropped the
eal exchange rate and risk and substituted them for the nominal interest rate which is able to partially summarise these combined effects. We also
ncluded the minimum wage, as a measure for increases in purchasing power directly related to the president’s actions.
9 The choice of Veja’s magazine has been revealed to be a controversial one, as there are many other media vehicles that could have been used
nstead and because there is as perception that some journals and magazines can be viewed as more biased towards one president or another. It
ollows that the interpretation of the news parameter has to be properly explained in order to avoid confusion. The objective of the index is to control
or political news (good and bad) that could have affected opinion polls significantly, thus explaining that part of the variability in approval rates that
as not related to changes in economic conditions per se. These stories could have first appeared on TV, radio or any other newspaper. Clearly, Veja
ould also be the main original source of these news, especially the bad ones that plagued both presidencies, but this is less important. Veja’s cover
s obviously a limited and imperfect measure of the political scenario. However, its choice for the creation of the index, despite being arbitrary, was
ased on the hypothesis that the constructed index would reflect most of political news.
10 This number is not as big as the raw numbers on approval ratings per se indicate. However, due to the autoregressive nature of the model, the
ong run equilibrium effect of the dummy is much higher (about 50%). Nonetheless, as it will be shown, this effect should not be overstated, as there
s a marked difference between time trends in both presidencies.
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Sources: Approval rates are own elaboration using data from Sensus and Datafolha. Domestic unemployment is from IBGE.
(65.6 ×  0,25 = 16.4%), when his predicted popularity would thus be higher than Lula’s.11 However, there are two
important remarks to be made. First, the interpretation of the time trend is very hard to make, as personal charisma is
unlikely to be changing over time. It could be reflecting some missing variable that was affecting FHC’s popularity
more strongly than Lula’s – Graph 1 may provide the reader with convincing visual evidence of the existence of a
increasing approval rate for FHC, when compared to Lula’s. Second, the negative value of the trend and its size are due
to a scale choice. If we had chosen the logarithm of the minimum wage instead of the value in Reais, the parameter size
would drop significantly (to −0.08), so we should not overstate the interpretation of the point estimate. In any case, it is
possible to conclude that when controlled for the macroeconomic and political variables, a constant and deterministic
time trends, differences between the presidents vanish as the sample grows.12
5.1.  Popularity  and  employment
Fig. 4 helps us to analyze one of the most interesting results found in the paper: the relationship between approval
rates and unemployment. Observe that the regression line presented in the same figure suggests a negative relationship
between approval rates and unemployment. In fact, a simple ordinary least squares regression between the approval
rate, a constant and the unemployment rate reveals an estimated parameter of −5.38, with a significant coefficient at
the 1% confidence level. In other words, the figure suggests a sort of a “Phillips Curve” with approval rates in the place
of inflation rates: the lower the unemployment rate, the bigger the president’s approval is.
Figs. 1 and 2 suggest that a deterministic trend or a stochastic trend could be a common feature for both series
during this time period. We had already seen that this is not a spurious relationship as we have controlled for the
deterministic trend in addition to other control variables (generating a smaller parameter value, −1.66). Also, as
previously mentioned, we have tested the model with the first difference of the unemployment series in the GUM
in an earlier version of this paper. We found a significant correlation between the first difference of the logarithm of
unemployment and the log of approval rates, controlling for other variables and with residuals passing the standard
diagnostic tests. As the results point out to a robust correlation, we decided to discuss the relationship between both
variables in this separate section.
11 Due to the nature of the linear estimation strategy, predicted approval rates can exceed the lower and higher bounds at 0% and 100%, respectively.
Although this might be considered a weakness of the model, it must be stated that parameter estimates are still consistent if the assumptions about
the error term are as in the classical linear time series model. These assumptions “hold” with the Autometrics selection, as far as the residuals in the
GUM pass all the relevant tests.
12 Several test specifications (i.e., different specifications for the GUM, for example, including contemporaneous variables) were performed using
Autometrics. The general conclusion is that Lula’s dummy and the time trends were present in the final selection of nearly all of them. This might
reflect the fact that they are already highly significant in the GUM, as shown in Table 6.
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The “naive” curve (model) estimated above implies stronger effects of changes in unemployment on approval rates
han the ones found with the GUM. For a drop of one percentage point in unemployment rates, the predicted rate
ould increase 1.66 percentage points, as discussed earlier and shown in Table 7. These findings lead us to speculate
n a more elaborate association between both variables as given by an augmented “Phillips Curve”, for instance. Some
uestions could emerge from our evidence: is there a “natural” approval rate, for example, one that could be observed
hen the unemployment rate is equal to its natural rate? This question could become a theme for future research.
The relationship that is presented in Fig. 4 holds for the period when Brazil experienced low or moderate inflation
evels. A possibly convincing theoretical explanation for the moderate observed inflation rates that were observed in
hat period is the problem of dynamic inconsistency. This problem generally presupposes the existence of an optimum
ncome level that is higher than the flexible level price of output and, hence, an optimal unemployment rate smaller
han the natural rate. In order to justify why monetary authorities would engage in policies of inflationary surprises,
ne also needs to assume a dilemma between inflation and unemployment, at least in the short run.
This theoretical framework allows us to elaborate a hypothesis on the functional form of Fig. 4. Since the President
as some control of the fiscal and monetary policy, he or she can choose policies that lead to an unemployment
ate below the natural rate which, in its turn, would imply higher levels of popular approval. These low levels of
nemployment would cause (demand) inflation. According to the results that were found in the paper, the average
ndividual does not penalize the President for moderate inflation (on a statistic basis). During a period of monetary
tability, the main punishment is given by higher levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, the moderate levels of inflation
hat were observed during the period under analysis would be due to the higher weight given by the monetary authority
o deviations of inflation from target.
The analogy with dynamic inconsistency models is also interesting for another reason. In repeated games models, in
hich reputation is important, some optimal strategies are characterized by “planting” reputation in order to “harvest”
eviations from the natural rate of unemployment. Higher popularity could increase the chance of an incumbent being
eelected or help winning an election if approval rates can be “transferred” to a preferred candidate. In spite of the fact
hat approval rates are correlated to the past whereas votes are connected to the future, the possibility of transference
f approval rates (between the incumbent and his/hers chosen candidate) is possible if approval rates and votes are
ighly correlated, in other words, if the electorate uses the past in order to anticipate the future. In that sense, the very
ow unemployment rate and the pressure on real wages and prices that were observed at the end of Lula’s mandate
long with the victory of the Workers Party’s candidate in the 2010 elections, could be explained by monetary theory
nd the curve revealed above.
.  Concluding  remarks
To what degree is the rate of president approval determined by macroeconomic conditions? Are these conditions
ore important than personal charisma (or any other personal trait) to determine citizen’s perception of the president?
By having analyzed the performance of monthly presidential approval rates from 1999M9 to 2010M5 via an
utomated selection procedure, and having the estimations controlled for a significant set of economic and political
ariables, the present paper provided original evidence regarding Brazil, a developing country and a young democracy.
uring the sample period, Brazil was not only governed by two presidents with very different backgrounds, but was
lso subject to different economic conditions.
Our paper showed that domestic economic and political indicators are able to explain and predict a significant
art of presidential approval ratings in Brazil. The economic variables that seemed to be most strongly correlated to
pproval ratings, in a ceteris  paribus  interpretation, are the minimum wage and domestic unemployment. Domestic
nemployment, in a period of price stability, seems to be penalizing the Brazilian population most, if one considers
hat this penalty is further reflected in a poor evaluation of the president (Annex A).
Another important result is that President Lula’s approval rate is higher than President’s FHC, even after controlling
or the economic and political scenario. However, this difference seems not to be as high as the sample averages
omparison (between approval rates) would suggest. Also, when controlled for a time trend, the popularity differences
etween both presidents vanish as the sample size grows. The interpretation of a significant time trend is difficult to
ake, but this result suggests a missing variable, which is less likely to be personal charisma because it is growing
ith time. Hence, our findings support the conclusion that the economy (given no political turmoil) is a very important
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factor that explains popularity in Brazil, but personal characteristics are also likely to exert an influence on a citizen’s
evaluation.
In spite of its limitations, this study may have opened up an avenue of research on the macroeconomic determinants
of presidential approval rates in Brazil. Further works could investigate the response of citizens to deviations of variables
from their equilibrium values, such as unemployment from natural unemployment or optimal values, the inflation rate
from its (hypothetical) optimal inflation or even deviations of inflation from target. One could also analyze possible
asymmetric effects of positive and negative deficits on approval rates and to overcome the difficulties regarding the
availability of data on approval rates and other economic and political measures.
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Annex  A.
Veja’s front cover – I.
Month/year Day of the week Veja’s front cover
April/2000 12 Corruption
May/2000 3 Failures on Brazil’s 500-year celebration
July/2000 19 Eduardo Jorge
September/2000 6 FHC leads Latin-American meeting
April/2001 11 Corruption in Brazilian Sudan
May/2001 16 Apagão (Energetic sector crisis)
May/2001 23 Chico Lopes &Salvatore Cacciola
June/2001 6 Apagão (Energetic sector crisis)
January/2003 8 Lulas’s election victory
January/2003 15 Lula’s confusion in the beginning of mandate
September/2003 10 Brasilia: the island of fantasy
October/2003 15 Brasil against USA at ALCA meeting
February/04 25 PT illegal source of funds
March/2004 10, 31 José Dirceu as a trouble for Lula
May/2004 19 Lula banishes foreign reporter
June/2004 9 The success of Palocci as ministry of Finance
July/2004 7 Unpunished corruptors
August/2004 11 Henrique Meirelles
August/2004 18 PT against Brazilian media
January/2005 26 PT and Brazilian illiteracy
March/2005 16 FARC donations to Brazilian PT
May/2005 25 Corruption in Brazilian Correios
June/2005 1 Roberto Jefferson
June/2005 8 Corruption in Brazilian PT
June/2005 15 Delúbio Soares
June/2005 22 José Dirceu has been fired
June/2005 29 PT’s great mistake
July/2005 6 Marcos Valério
July/2005 13 Did Lula know about the “mensalão”?
July/2005 20 Lula had been warned about “mensalão”
July/2005 27 Marcos Valério
August/2005 3 José Dirceu
August/2005 10 Is Lula’s government similar to Collor’s?
August/2005 17 Lula against impeachment
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nnex (Continued  )
onth/year Day of the week Veja’s front cover
ugust/2005 24 Allegations against Palocci
eptember/2005 21 PT Crisis
ctober/2005 19 The death of Celso Daniel
ovember/2005 2 Illegal campaign donation from Cuba to Lula
ovember/2005 30 Palocci’s vulnerability
anuary/2006 18 Duda Mendonc¸a &foreign bank accounts
arch/2006 8 Marcos Valério
arch/2006 29 Angela Guadagnin dancing in the Legislative
pril/2006 5 Allegations against Pallocci
pril/2006 19 Crisis in Brazilian PT
ay/2006 10 Hugo Chaves against Brazilian Petrobrás
ay/2006 31 Thomaz Bastos as the Lula guardian
une/2006 14 Depredation of the Brazilian Legislative House
uly/2006 26 Corruption in the Brazilian health system
eptember/2006 27 Was Lula aware of corruption?
ctober/2006 18 PT illegal source of funds
ctober/2006 25 Allegations against Lula’s son
ugust/2007 15 Marcos Valério
ecember/2007 19 The defeat of PT on CPMF voting
anuary/2008 30 Scandals in Brazilian Correios
ebruary/2008 13 Scandals about payment cards (tapioca)
ebruary/2009 25 Corruption
eptember/2009 30 “Brazilian Imperialism”
ovember/2009 25 Movie based on Lula’s life
ecember/2009 2 Corruption
anuary/2010 27 Lula’s health problems
arch/2010 10, 17 Workers’ party (PT) finances
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